Rebuilding care in a post-pandemic world Working Papers US





Assessment Tools for Analyzing Protections For Paid In-home/Domestic Workers

Heidi Gottfried

Working Paper Series Organizer: Heidi Gottfried

Graphic design, cover and layout: Fernanda Kalckmann

Sponsors:



Granting Agency:



NSF/Trans-Atlantic Platform "Who cares? Rebuilding care in a post-pandemic world" (Grant no. 2215780).

Preface



Heidi Gottfried

This is the third working paper in a series on care work and the COVID-19 pandemic sponsored by the Trans-Atlantic Platform (T-AP), with NSF as the funder of the U.S. component. The T-AP project brings together inter-disciplinary teams from six transatlantic countries across three world regions: Canada and the United States in North America; Brazil and Colombia in Latin America; and France and the United Kingdom in Europe. The T-AP project will advance our understanding of the organization and conditions of care work in rapidly aging societies within the context of a growing deficit of inclusive social policies and effective regulations. Adequate data on, and an accurate picture of policy gaps, is necessary in order to build a more resilient, just, equitable and sustainable long-term care infrastructure. The findings will inform recommendations for the formulation of interventions addressing inequalities and vulnerabilities aimed at creating systemic resilience that can withstand future pandemics and public health and care crises. This project will contribute to the development of public policies on care work aimed at bringing them in line with decent work standards.

Assessment Tools for Analyzing Protections For Paid In-home/Domestic Workers



Heidi Gottfried



Summary

Assessment Tools for Analyzing Protections for Paid In-Home/Domestic Workers 3

1.0 Scorecards: Assessment Tools for Analyzing Policy 3

Table 1. Oxfam Scorecard on Paid Care Work5

Table 2. ILO Scope of Policies for Paid Domestic Workers6

Table 3. GCPI Protection for Paid Domestic Workers8

2.0 Decoding the GCPI in Comparative Perspective 9

Table 5. GCPI in comparative perspective10

3.0 Political Economic and Social Welfare Indicators in Comparative Perspective 12

Table 6. Selected Socio-Economic, Demographic, Social WelfareIndicators by country14

4.0 Conclusions 15

Sub-index B: protections for domestic workers in Colombia 16

5.0 Appendix on Comparative Policies 16

References 17

Assessment Tools for Analyzing Protections for Paid In-Home/Domestic Workers

Working Paper #3 reviews the state of knowledge about scorecards designed to evaluate provisions and the scope of care policies for paid in-home/domestic workers.¹ This working paper coordinates and organizes previous research to build an agenda for analyzing country-specific protections for paid domestic workers (see Working Papers #1 and 2), offering cross-national and transregional comparisons across our six country cases. This Working Paper consists of three main parts to highlight what we know, to detail our gaps in knowledge, and to offer strategies that can address these gaps by providing a roadmap for further research by country teams and for conducting comparative analysis. Section one evaluates extant scorecards designed to measure the strength of protections for paid domestic workers. It critically assesses limitations of existing datasets and tools available to analyze protections for paid domestic workers, both pre-pandemic and COVID-19 responses. An extended evaluation of the Global Care Policy Index, in section two, lays the groundwork for interpreting policy provisions through in-depth country-specific reports (see Working Paper #2) that can advance our understanding of the regulatory framework and the gaps of protections within countries and drivers of variation between countries. The final section outlines our coordinated next steps.

1.0 Scorecards: Assessment Tools for Analyzing Policy

Feminist economists and women's rights activists introduced scorecards as a readymade rubric that could be used for systematic assessment of care policies and gender-sensitive government budgeting (Elson 2008; Folbre 2012). Scorecards highlight the extent to which the design and/or absence of care policies either widen or reduce inequalities in the division of care labor (Esquivel and Faur 2012; Nanda et al. 2022, 79-80), both *between* households, the private sector, the state, and communities/third-sector (i.e., the care diamond, Razavi 2007) and *within* households (between men and women) (Qui and Paul 2022, Butt et al. 2021). Until now, most scorecards were outcome-based and heterogeneous in measurements and methods of data collection (Nanda et al. 2022).

Reviewed here are scorecards produced by Oxfam, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Global Care Policy Index (GCPI) project that audit the scope of protections for paid caregivers. The three policy scorecards adopt different scoring procedures across either a broader or narrower set of policies. Section one presents these assessment tools drawing lessons from their relative strengths and weaknesses.

¹ This working paper is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant no. 2215780. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

1.1 Scoring Policies

A scorecard can measure the scope, content, and/or effectiveness of public policies usually within a national jurisdiction offering a snapshot in time (Nanda et al. 2022; Qui and Paul 2022). The assessment requires selection of indicators from which to construct a metric for scoring policies. They can draw on a variety of statistical and textual sources, depending on the purpose of the analysis, ranging from standardized databases available from international organizations (ILO, World Bank, UN), and legislative and legal databases (ILO legislative series, NATLEX, Social Security Policy Throughout the World, see Tonelli et al. 2021, 4) as well as from national governmental surveys and agency reports.

Scoring can range from simple metrics to more granular measures. The simplest procedure records a binary response of either absence or presence of a policy or specific policy provision (0, 1) (see, for example, the World Bank scan of COVID policies, in Table 3.1, Appendix 1).² More granular scores assign a value ranging from no provision to full coverage, accounting for restrictions that limit coverage.

1.2 Oxfam Paid Care Work Policy Scorecard

In 2021, Oxfam published a "Care Policy Scorecard" for assessing the transformative potential of care policies, deploying indices available from UNWomen, the World Bank, and the ILO (Nanda et al. 2022). Oxfam's care policy scorecard broadly sweeps across gender-and care-related issues, "including the existence of campaigns to reduce gender stereotyping, the existence of a national measurement framework that monitors progress on wellbeing, and also protections for unpaid and paid caregivers" (Paul et al. 2022). For each policy indicator there is a set of assessment criteria (from 12 to 22 for each indicator), assigning either a 'Yes' (1), 'Partially' (.5) or 'No' (0) response to identify the presence of an indicator (Butt et al. 2021, 20). These are summed, divided by the total number of assessment questions for each policy area, then multiplied by 100, arriving at a percentage, ranging from 0 to 100% (Butt et al. 2021, 28). Higher percentages imply a higher potential for realizing transformative effects. Four main policy areas are used to evaluate paid care work conditions and protections for paid care workers (see Table 1). Each policy area is further broken down into key indicators, laying out assessment criteria in terms of subcategories, including legislation and ratification (referring to relevant ILO conventions); accessibility and exclusivity (e.g., considering the coverage of informality); budgeting and administration; regulation and monitoring; and design and impact (see Table 1).

2 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/281531621024684216/pdf/Social-Protection-and-Jobs-Responsesto-COVID-19-A-Real-Time-Review-of-Country-Measures-May-14-2021.pdf

Policy Area 2: Paid Care Work	Indicators	# of Questions
	2.1.1 Minimum wages ³	17
2.1: Labor conditions and wage policies	2.1.2 Gender Wage gap and equal pay for Equal Work ⁴	14
	2.1.3 Working Hours⁵	15
	2.1.4 Right to Social Security ⁶	18
	2.1.5 Child rights and labor protections ⁷	15
	2.2.1 Occupational health and safety in the workplace ⁸	18
2.2: Workplace environment regulations	2.2.2 Protection against gender-based discrimination, harassment and violence in the workplace ⁹	19
	2.2.3 Workplace Inspections and grievance mechanisms ¹⁰	16
2.3: Migrant care workers' protections	2.3.1 Equal rights and protections for migrant care workers ¹¹	17
2.4: Right to organize	2.4.1 Right to representation and negotiation, freedom of association and right to strike ¹²	14

Table 1. Oxfam Scorecard on Paid Care Work

- 3 Butt et al. (2021, 68-69)
- 4 Butt et al. (2021, 69-71).
- 5 Butt et al. (2021, 71-72)
- 6 Butt et al. (2021, 72-74)
- 7 (Butt et al., 2021, 75-76)
- 8 (Butt et al., 2021, 77-78)
- 9 (Butt et al., 2021, 78-80)
- 10 (Butt et al., 2021, 80-82)
- 11 (Butt et al., 2021, 82-84)
- 12 (Butt et al., 2021, 85-86)

1.3 ILO: Policies for Paid Domestic Workers Scorecard

By contrast, the ILO identifies the scope of a more limited set of policy provisions for the protection of paid domestic workers at the national level.¹³ Their scoring procedure resembles Oxfam's Yes/restrictions/No metric but adds further gradation to capture degrees of restrictions. As shown in Table 2, the scope of policies is graded from 1 to 3, and 9. The value of 1 signifies full coverage or similar or better coverage than other workers, 2 indicates higher limits than other workers or less favorable treatment, 3 denotes no entitlement or lesser entitlement, and 9 refers to the lack of available information or that the policy is enacted at a subnational level (such as states and provinces). Scores compare paid domestic worker's access to benefits and rights relative to the standard for other workers. Focusing on the national scale, the ILO scorecard excludes policies enacted and extending benefits by subnational jurisdictional authorities, resulting in missing data, particularly relevant among countries with federalized governance systems (Williams and Brennan 2012). As a result, with all policies assigned nines across the board, Canada lacks any substantive information.

Country	General Labor Law	Weekly hours	Weekly Rest	Paid Annual Leave	Minimum Wage	In-kind Payment	Maternity Leave	Maternity Cash benefit
Brazil	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Colombia								
	3	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
Live-In	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Live-out								
United States	1	1	9	9	1	1	3	3
Canada	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
United Kingdom								
Live-in	3	3	1	1	3	1	1	1
Live-out	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1

Table 2. ILO Scope of Policies for Paid Domestic Workers

Source: ILO, 2021, pp. 286, 288-289

Scope: 1 covered by general labor laws, 3 covered by subordinate regulations or specific labor laws, 9 federal countries with provisions that very by states

Weekly hours: 1 limitation same or lower than other workers, 2 limitations higher than other workers, 3 no limitation, 9 info unavailable/differs by states;

Weekly Rest: 1 same or better than other workers, 9 info unavailable/differs by states;

13 The ILO's new care policy portal covers policies for caregivers and care recipients. <u>https://www.ilo.org/</u>globalcare/



Paid Annual Leave: 1 same or longer, 9 information unavailable/differs by states;
Minimum Wage: 1 same, 3 no statutory minimum wage, 9 info unavailable/differs by states;
In-kind Payment: 1 Minimum wage can be paid in cash payment, 2 part of the minimum wage can be paid in-kind, 9 information unavailable/differs by states;
Maternity leave: 1 same or better, 3 No entitlement, 9 info unavailable/differs by states;

Maternity cash benefit: 1 same or better; 3 no entitlement; 9 information unavailable/differs by states;

1.4 The Global Care Policy Index

An alternative scorecard presents a novel Global Care Policy Index (GCPI). The GCPI produces a numerical assessment of a country's policy support for and protections of paid and unpaid care providers in or for a household. It is a composite index comprising two sub-indices, each given equal weight: Sub-Index A considers policies providing protections to unpaid caregivers; and Sub-Index B assesses a country's policy protections for paid domestic workers who engage in care-work in a private home setting within an employment relationship (Qiu and Paul 2022; Paul et al. 2022).

Subindex B consists of six main policy areas, further broken down by subcategories using 65 questions laid out in a country technical report. Each question operationalizes a specific care policy provision based on its relevance to ILO conventions or recommendations, and scores countries based on how well the policy matches the ILO standard. As such, it serves as an aspirational benchmark. Paul and her collaborators score each provision from 0 (no protections) to 1 (full protections at or exceeds ILO standards). To account for exclusionary conditions, they apply a deduction of 0.25 points for each exclusionary condition (Qui and Paul 2022, 644; Paul et al. 2022a). A country that has four or more exclusionary conditions receives a score of 0.1 out of 1 (Qui and Paul, 2022, 645). ¹⁴ Each sub-category score is calculated by summing the unweighted scores of all the questions in the sub-category and then converting that to a 0-to-10 scale for GCPI categories (see Table 3).

¹⁴ An elaboration of the index calculation method for each country and technical reports are available from the GCPI project.



Table 3. GCPI Protection for Paid Domestic Workers

Protection for Paid Domestic Workers

B1. Coverage under National Labor Laws

Rebuilding care in a post-pandemic world

Whether the country's legal architecture is designed to extend rights to domestic workers with the same rights as other workers (2 questions)

B2. Fair Employment Process

Working Papers - US

Protections of domestic workers during the employment process. Measures whether domestic workers provided sufficient and accurate information about their employment and if government can regulate the process (8 questions)

B2.1 Standard Terms of Employment

B2.2 Regulations for recruitment and employment process

B3. Decent Working and Living Conditions

Legal provisions that provide workers with decent working and living conditions, including working hours and environment, rest and leave, wages, social security, and living conditions for li in domestic workers (32 questions)

B3.1Working Hours and Environment

B3.2 Rest and Leave

B3.3 Wages

B3.4 Social Security

B3.5 Living Conditions for Live-in Workers

B4. Labor Rights and Protections

Whether domestic workers guaranteed sufficient labor rights to prevent or provide remedies to abuses against them (8 questions)

B4.1 Freedom of Association and Access to Collective Bargaining

B4.2 Access to Complaint Mechanisms

B4.3 Enforcement and Protection Mechanisms

B5. Protections for Forced/Under-age Domestic Workers

Whether extra protections provided to two vulnerable groups (8 questions)

B5.1 Protections against Forced/Compulsory Labor

B5.2 Protections for Under-age Laborers

B6. Protections for Migrant Domestic Workers¹⁵

Whether extra protections provided to migrant workers, subject to vulnerability specific to migrants. Scored if overall migrant domestic workers at least 10% of overall domestic worker population in a country (7 questions)

B6.1 Employment Support

B6.2 Support After Termination of Employment

Sources: NATLEX ILO source of regulations

Sources of data include scans of relevant national ministries/agencies in each country and international organizations, principally the World Bank and the ILO website on national policies. In pursuit of information about protections for migrant care workers (B6), the project creatively found alternative supplementary sources, ranging from consultations with law firms specializing in migration, interviews with expats to discuss their experience moving across borders, to newspaper stories (such as scandals and stories about violations of domestic workers' rights).¹⁶

	Scores
ent	
ve-	

¹⁵ B6 protections for migrant domestic workers are not scored if the percentage of migrant to domestic workers falls below 10% or if there are no dedicated visa categories or immigration policies that track domestic migrants (Paul et al. 2022, 655).

¹⁶ This information was gleaned from personal communication with Anju Mary Paul and country profiles.



1.5 Limitations: A Comparison

Of the three scorecards, Oxfam constructs the most comprehensive rubric, reaching across a larger policy matrix. Oxfam assesses the workplace environment including key indicators such as protections against gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment. But what is gained in its reach is lost in its lack of granularity. Further, Oxfam's scorecard is a tool produced for local groups interested in assessing a broad range of national care policies. Due to its complicated formula and reliance on the work of voluntary local groups, only a few Oxfam scorecards have been produced to date. The alternative ILO and GCPI scorecards employ a team of experts scoring policies centrally, allowing for more consistency in scoring practices (Paul et al. 2022) and including a larger number of countries across world regions. By contrast to Oxfam, the GCPI and the ILO score the scope of policies and do not attempt to determine the effectiveness or transformative potentials of policy outcomes, which is the aim of the Oxfam scorecard. All three comparative policy scorecards assess policies enacted almost exclusively on the national/federal level. This shortcoming is most notable in the ILO's scoring procedures, which results in extensive missing data for countries with federalized governance, as apparent for the cases of Canada and the US. The GCPI similarly considers national-level policies, though the project assessed legislative coverage at the provincial level for several questions in Canada (GCPI Canada Report 2022, 2), whereas scoring legislative coverage at the state level was deemed unfeasible for the US. The GCPI project produces the best approximations of strengths and weaknesses of rights and protections for paid domestic workers. The next section evaluates Subindex B of the GCPI in greater detail, identifying possible adjustments to address limitations.

2.0 Decoding the GCPI in Comparative Perspective

The GCPI aims to achieve two objectives: first, to systematically assess how states' domestic-care provider protections match up to International Labor Organization policy benchmarks, and second, to incentivize states to improve their policy protections for care providers in the domestic sphere by "harnessing their competitive instincts to improve their GCPI score" (Paul et al. 2022a). ¹⁷ The prodigious effort coding policy provisions by the GCPI team produced both qualitative descriptions and robust quantitative measures of protections for caregivers. Overall, the GCPI assesses a country's care-provider protections, allowing for fast and direct care-policy comparisons between countries in the same region and with the same development status. Country reports come with a companion technical report explaining the score for each policy provision.

Arraying countries side-by-side puts in sharp relief the scope of each country's protection for paid domestic workers (see Table 5). These scores, however, may underestimate

¹⁷ New country reports are continually being added to the original dataset.

or exaggerate the extent of social protections for domestic workers, a bias that the GCPI authors recognize as related to data limitations and methodological choices.¹⁸ For example, Colombia only recently granted partial protections for domestic workers in 2016 (Paul et al. 2022, 647), yet the overall score suggests relatively strong regulations. National labor laws, even those recognizing domestic workers (see Guimaraes on Brazil; Pineda 2023; Posse et al. 2023 on Colombia), often exclude informally employed workers from access and coverage, or impose exemptions and exclusions. Thus, a high score earned can exaggerate the extent of protection in countries with high levels of informality among domestic workers. Overall, in Latin America, 72.3% of paid domestic workers are informally employed as compared to 56.4% among non-domestic workers (ILO, 2021, 233). Informality accounts for 79.9% of paid domestic workers in Colombia and 62.1% in Brazil (Poblete 2023, 144).

Subindex B Protections for Paid Domestic Workers	Colombia	Canada	UK	US	Sweden
B Composite Score	6.79	7.55	8.34	3.44	7.34
B.1 Coverage under National Labor Laws	7.50	7.50	10.00	1.75	8.75
B.2 Fair Employment Process	6.60	6.61	7.73	0.57	3.04
B.3 Decent working and living conditions	4.63	7.55	4.80	2.93	6.70
B.4 Labor Rights and Protections	8.96	7.92	8.96	4.17	9.79
B.5 Protections forced/underage workers	6.25	7.38	9.50	6.00	10.00
B.6 Protections for Migrant domestic Workers	-	8.38	9.03	5.25	5.75

Table 5. GCPI in comparative perspective

The GCPI offers baseline composite scores for assessing national protections for paid domestic workers. Paul et al. (2022) acknowledge limitations and potential biases in the construction of the Global Care Policy Index, which includes: 1) examining policies and regulation primarily at the national level; 2) applying equal weights to calculate composite scores; and 2) scoring formal policy rather than either implementation or effectiveness.¹⁹ Paul makes two important caveats modifying expectations: if the majority of domestic workers are informal then they may not benefit from the strong regulations and conversely, countries lacking strong enforcement mechanisms with existing labor regulations will cre-

18 GCPI composite scores do not take into account the relative importance of each segment of the "care diamond" (the state, the market, the family/households, and community/voluntary) delivering care (Razavi 2007).

19 Subsequent papers by Paul and her co-authors (2022; 2023) use the database for explaining cross national patterns.

ate "larger policy-practice gaps." What follows sets out our strategic goals aimed at building on and augmenting the GCPI for the six countries in the T-AP project.

Multi-Scalar: For practical reasons, the GCPI generally excludes state- and municipal-based policy initiatives. Documenting and scoring policies at the national level, especially for countries with federal governance systems, is an acknowledged problem in comparative research (Williams and Brennan 2012). In Canada, labor and employment policies devolve to the ten provinces and three territories (Paul et al. 2022, 7), except for unemployment insurance, a federal program. To take account of province/state differences, the GCPI team conducted a two-step weighting process to arrive at a population-weighted average score for each policy provision in which different policies were adopted (Paul et al. 2022a, 7). More dramatically, geographic residence influences levels of protection, eligibility requirements, and levels of compensation of domestic workers in the US (Milkman 2023b). Domestic workers' protection shows considerable variation by state as we documented in Working Paper #1.

Even in countries with centralized government, state and municipal authorities enact policies expanding rights and improving conditions even in the absence of national policies. Multi-scalar analyses present methodological problems of comparability across cases. Indeed, as the GCPI project concluded, scoring state by state policies in the US would complicate comparisons with other countries. For this reason, the T-AP project will principally use national scores from the GCPI, supplemented by qualitative assessment of relevant case studies at the state/provincial, and municipal levels.

ILO Standards and Expanded Policy Matrix: The index relies on ILO standards as the reference for scoring protections covering paid domestic workers. ILO standards focus on labor rights and decent working conditions as aspirational norms (Paul 2023). The T-AP project will supplement the GCPI tracing the development of policies beyond the six policy areas included in the index. Members of country teams will augment the short summaries offered in the GCPI country report (see Working Paper #2).

Rescaling the Index: The GCPI project decided on applying equal weights for ease of creating comparable measures across a large number of countries. Yet, the composite index and subindices may exaggerate or underestimate social protections depending on levels of informality, numbers of unauthorized migrants, the size of the gray market,²⁰ and the significance of subnational jurisdictional authority, as discussed above. Significantly, informality is not factored into the measure, an omission particularly relevant in global South countries such as Colombia and Brazil with large informal domestic care sectors. To take account of informality, the project will estimate changes in the value of relevant metrics and provide a supplemental grading such that the score reflects the share of the informal workforce. Both the unadjusted number and the adjusted metric will be reported.

²⁰ The US Team is designing a study that can better understand the characteristics and employment conditions of this labor force.

Efficacy and effectiveness: Measuring efficacy and effectiveness were beyond the scope of the GCPI project. Subsequent papers written by members of the GCPI team found correlates of effectiveness. The T-AP project will include wage levels and benefits earned by paid domestic workers as an outcome variable.²¹ Wage levels will be adjusted in reference to the median wage in each country. Such data measures workers' compensation and not merely whether a law entitles workers to minimum wages (as scored in B3).

3.0 Political Economic and Social Welfare Indicators in Comparative Perspective

The Global Care Policy Index project presents select socio-demographic statistics for contextualizing country cases, including the overall population, percent of the population over 65, the female labor force participation rate, the UN human development index, the number of ILO conventions in force relative to the number ratified, and the Labor Rights Index (Paul et al. 2022; Paul 2023). The Labor Rights Index, like the GCPI, is a composite score measuring decent work; it combines ten labor rights regulations (fair wages, decent working hours, employment security, family responsibilities, maternity at work, safe work, social security, fair treatment, child and forced labor and trade union) scored from 0 to 100, creating six bands of decent work conditions.

The three labor rights indicators generally align with each other. Yet, a discrepancy between the Labor Index and GCPI stems from the fact that each index taps a different set of labor rights enshrined in national policies. The Labor Rights Index generalizes across economic sectors while the GCPI standardizes scores specifically aimed at caregivers. Ratification of ILO conventions signals a country's commitment to align national policies with international labor standards. Notably, Colombia ratified a large number of ILO conventions, despite the predominance of conservative governments, succeeded only recently by the election of a left-wing candidate, Gustavo Petro in 2021. The US is known to be a laggard in ratifying international conventions, but why Canada has a similar weak record needs further investigation. Among the countries in the T-AP project, only Brazil (not shown here) and Colombia are signatories of C189 Domestic Workers Convention (on the politics of ratification see Marchetti, Cherubini, Geymonat, 2021).

Social spending as a % of GDP indicates generosity of the overall state budget dedicated to social welfare; spending on the Labor Market as a % of GDP indicates the state's social investment in support of labor market programs, and the Gini coefficient is a standard measure of societal inequality. Public spending on the labor market combines social investment expenditures on public employment services, training, hiring subsidies and direct job creation in the public sector, as well as unemployment benefits (OECD 2022) – however, unemployment benefits administered by states/provinces can vary widely from locale to locale.

²¹ Anju Mary Paul suggested that we use the median wage as a possible indicator of effectiveness.



Public spending on the labor market indicates the state's role in modifying the vagaries of the market not only mitigating against loss of employment (decommodification), but also through expansion of public sector employment, which has both a direct and indirect effect on the quality and conditions of care work. Finally, societal inequalities are associated with paid domestic service prevalence (Jokela 2015; Milkman 2023; Estévez-Abe 2015).

Country	Population (millions)	% Population over 65	FLFP%	HDI	Gini Coefficient	Social spending %GDP22	Public Spending Labor Market % GDP23	IlO ratification24
Canada	37.6	19	61	0.922	0.333	24.9	0.700	23/37
Colombia	49.6	8	57	0.761	0.513	15.2	N/A	52/61
US	331	16	57	0.926	0.414	22.7	0.250	10/14
UK	66.5	18	58	0.932	0.351	22.1	0.530	53/88
Sweden	10.4	20	62	0.945	0.333	23.7	1.50	67/94

Table 6. Selected Socio-Economic, Demographic, Social Welfare **Indicators by country**

Source: Data from Paul et al. 2022 a, b, except for social spending and labor market spending (OECD 2022) and the Gini coefficient.

Sub-index B	Labor Rights		
Sub-maex b	Index		
7.56	76		
6.79	73		
3.44	63.5		
8.17	83		
7.34	92		



²² Social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes, which may be targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons and must involve either redistribution of resources across households or compulsory participation (OECD 2022). For 2021, except Canada for 2020, OECD (2022), 31.6% in France.

²³ Public spending on labor market programs includes public employment services, training, hiring subsidies and direct job creations in the public sector, as well as unemployment benefits. 2018 data, 2015, Canada (OECD 2022).

²⁴ This measures the number of ILO conventions in force out of the number ratified.

4.0 Conclusions

A scorecard records a snapshot of the policy matrix in a single point of time. It is a useful heuristic for pinpointing gaps in provisions and identifying what areas are in need of remediation. The working papers construct historical narratives based on primary and secondary sources complemented by process tracing of social policy reforms (care, employment, immigration, health and safety, tax) at the national scale and selected jurisdictions at the subnational scale. Historical narratives contextualize the institutional framework of specific care arrangements in the care economy to better determine the factors explaining patterns of protections for paid domestic workers within and across countries over time. The country-specific reports extend policy analysis to the enactment of pandemic relief initiatives (as discussed in Working Paper #7).

Appendix: Adjusting Protections for Domestic Workers, Sub-index

Adjusting Protections for Domestic Workers, Sub-index B for the extent of informal work, using file "GCPI Calculation all countries- Rebuilding Care project."

There are 6 policy categories that are further broken down into 0 to 5 subcategories from a total of 66 questions (numbers 41 to 107). Each receives a score from 0-1 based on the existence of a policy and the number of restrictions. This number is adjusted with the goal of arriving at a way to further adjusting the scores of each of the relevant 66 levels modified by some indicator of low, medium, or high degree of informal work performed by domestic workers (based on ILO sources).

The process to adjust the scores for Columbia considering the large proportion of its domestic workforce employed informally, involved three steps. The first was to review each question that informed the scoring of the 6 policy categories for their relevance to the nature of the workforce, that is, to what degree does the question score need to be adjusted as a result of the incidence of informal work.

The second step selected those relevant questions receiving a score above 0-0.1. These questions received no adjustment due to the absence of a policy covering workers in general. Each of the designated questions received a negative "adjustment" of 0.15 points²⁵ (so that a score of 1.0 for that question is reduced to 0.85). The revised scores are used to recalculate each of the sub-index B policy subcategories, which in turn resulted in an adjustment of the overall score for sub-index B (Protections for Domestic Workers). The table below presents the original and adjusted scores to reflect the impact on the score of accounting for a large informal domestic workforce.

²⁵ The adjustment of 0.15 points reflects an assessment that the size of the informal workforce reduces the extent of protections among domestic workers. This metric was based on the nature of other deductions used in the original calculation.

POLICY	ORIGINAL	ADJUSTED
B1 Coverage under National Labor Laws	7.50	6.00
B2 Fair Employment Process	6.60	5.60
B3 Decent Working and Living Conditions	4.63	3.71
B4 Labor Rights and Protections	8.96	8.71
B5 Protections for Forced/Under-age Domestic Workers	6.25	6.25
OVERALL SCORE	6.79	6.05

SUB-INDEX B: PROTECTIONS FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS IN COLOMBIA

5.0 Appendix on Comparative Policies

Other resources for Assessing Policies in Comparative Perspective

The OECD Development Centre's Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) measures discrimination against women in social institutions across 179 countries. By taking into account laws, social norms and practices, the SIGI captures the underlying drivers of gender inequality with the aim to provide data necessary for transformative policy-change. The SIGI is also one of the official data sources for monitoring SDG 5.1.1 "Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce and monitor gender equality and women's empowerment."

Access the SIGI 2023 Database and find out more about gender discrimination in social norms.

https://www.genderindex.org/

Global Dynamics of Social Policy project, Bremen:

The Collaborative Research Centre 1342 (CRC 1342) "Global Dynamics of Social Policy", funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) since January 2018, examines public social policy in a global and historical perspective. The Collaborative Research Centre 1342 (CRC 1342) "Global Dynamics of Social Policy", funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) since January 2018, examines public social policy in a global and historical perspective.

https://www.socialpolicydynamics.de/research-programme

Gender, Migration, & the Work of Care (Ito Peng, Director, University of Toronto)



The Gender, Migration and the World of Care is a repository of original research on migration and care work. With support from several international partners, the project has produced policy analysis on gender, migration, and care.

https://cgsp-cpsm.ca/gender/about/

References

- Butt, Anam Parvez, Maria Del Rosario Castro Bernandini, Amber Parkes, Veronica Paz Arauco, Roula Seghaier, Nanda Sharmishtha (2021). Care Policy Scorecard: A tool for assessing country progress towards an enabling policy environment on care. Oxfam https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/care-policy-scorecard-a-tool-forassessing-country-progress-towards-an-enabling-621287/
- Esquivel, V. and E. Faur. (2012) 'Beyond maternalism? The political and social organization of childcare in Argentina', in S. Razavi and S. Staab (eds.) Global Variations in the Political and Social Economy of Care. Worlds Apart. Routledge/UNRISD Research in Gender and Development, New York and London: Routledge/UNRISD, 103–121.
- International Labor Organization (2021). Making Decent Work a Reality for Domestic Workers Geneva: ILO.
- Jokela, Merita (2015) Macro-Level Determinants of Paid Domestic Labour Prevalence: A Cross-National Analysis of Seventy-Four Countries. Social Policy & Society 14:3, 385–405.
- Milkman, Ruth (2023a) How Exceptional is the U.S. Case? Immigration, Inequality, and Stratification Among In-Home Care Workers. International Sociological Association World Congress, June 26, 2023.
- Milkman, Ruth (2023b) Stratification among In-Home Care Workers in the United States. Critical Sociology 49, 1: 11-22.
- Nanda, Sharmishtha, Ruth Oloo, Amber Parkes and Anam Parvez Butt (2022). The care policy scorecard. Gender & Development 30, 1-2, 77-95.
- OECD (2022) Social Expenditures https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm
- OECD. Gender Index. Paris: OECD. https://www.genderindex.org/
- Paul, Anju Mary (2023) Unpacking Cross-Country Variations in Domestic Worker Protections: Adopting a Policy Regime Perspective. Unpublished Paper present at the ISA World Congress, Melbourne, June 26.
- Paul, Anju Mary, Jiang Haolie, Cynthia Chen (2022a) If caring begins at home, who cares for the carers? Introducing the Global Care Policy Index. Global Policy, Nov. 2022, 13, 5; 640-55.

- Paul, Anju Mary, Jiang Haolie and Cynthia Chen (2022b) The Policy Impact of Women's Political Voice: A comparison of 26 Countries' Care Policies. Unpublished paper.
- Poblete, Lorena (2023) Las trabajadoras domésticas latinoamericanas frente a la pandemia de Covid-19 [Latin American domestic workers facing the Covid-19 pandemic] Revista Mexicana de Sociología 85: 137-167.
- Qiu, Sophia X. and Anju M. Paul. 2022. Global Care Policy Index: Technical Report for United States (Federal). Singapore: Global Care Policy Index.
- Razavi, Shahra (2007) The Political and Social Economy of Care in a Development Context: Conceptual Issues, Research Questions and Policy Options. Gender and Development Programme Paper Number 3. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Tonelli, Simone, Tobias Böger, Keonhi Son, Petra Buhr, Sonja Drobnič, and Johannes Huinink, 2021, "Codebook of the Historical Dataset of Child Benefit (HDCB)," available at: https://www.socialpolicydynamics.de/crc-1342-publications/crc-1342technical-paper-series.
- Williams, Fiona and Deborah Brennan (2012). Care, markets and migration in a globalising world: Introduction to the Special Issue. Journal of European Social Policy 22(4): 355–362.